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 Abstract 
 
Day of the week (DOW) effect has been well known in many markets. The United 
States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Switzerland all have been found to 
exhibit significant average negative Monday returns [Agrawal and Tandon, 1998]. 
Other developing markets in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are also found to 
have the same seasonality [Choudhry, 2000]. Australia however displays its DOW 
effect on Tuesdays rather than on Mondays (Jaffe and Westerfield [1985], Easton 
and Faff [1994]). Jaffe and Westerfield [1985] suggest that there might be a 
linkage between the U.S. Monday seasonal and the Asia-Pacific DOW effect as 
they are one day out of phase due to different time zone. Since then, a few studies 
have examined the relationship of daily returns among the markets. But to our 
knowledge, no study has directly investigated the relationship between U.S. 
Monday and Australia Tuesday effect. We therefore re-examine the anomaly and 
document that the DOW effect in Australia is Granger caused by the weekend 
effect in U.S. and not the other way conditional on the weekend effects in the 
U.K. and Japanese markets. We also find that in the post 1987 period, where the 
U.S. Monday returns are positively significant, Australia Tuesday returns also 
reverses its effect. This latter finding provides further evidence that the anomaly 
in Australia is induced by the weekend effect in the U.S. 
 
Keywords:  Day of the week effect; Granger causality; Australian stock returns 
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 1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Day of the week (DOW) effect has well been documented in the major markets since 
French [1980] discovered it. The United State, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Switzerland 
all have been found to exhibit significant average negative Monday returns [Agrawal and 
Tandon, 1998]. Other developing markets in Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand are also found 
with the same seasonalities [Choudhry, 2000]. Although numerous studies have attempted to 
offer explanations on U.S. evidence such as settlement procedures, institutional trading and 
delayed announcements of bad news, (see, for example, Keim and Stambaugh [1984], 
Lakonishok and Smidt [1988], Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran [1998]) no complete 
explanation has yet been offered to solve the puzzle. 
 
What’s interesting in the Australian stock market is that the DOW effect occurs on 
Tuesdays rather than on Mondays (see Jaffe and Westerfield [1985], Finn, Lynch and Moore 
[1991], and Easton and Faff [1994]).1 While there are few studies that examine the Australian  
data, Jaffe and Westerfield [1985] suggest that there maybe a linkage between the U.S. 
Monday seasonal and the Asia-Pacific DOW effect. They find that other major countries do 
exhibit similar seasonal as the U.S. but due to different time zones, the Far Eastern countries 
may experience one day out of phase effect. In fact, there is a 14 hours difference between 
Sydney and New York and that the Australian Stock Exchange opens 3 and half hours on 
Tuesdays after U.S. markets close on Mondays. Therefore, one could conjecture that the U.S. 
negative Monday returns potentially cause the negative Tuesday returns in Australia as the 
average negative performances of the U.S. markets on Mondays have immediate impact on 
the subsequent performance of the Australian market on Tuesdays. Jaffe and Westerfield, 
however, find some weak support over the linkage when they test the cross-correlation of 
non-contemporaneous daily returns between the U.S. and Australia. They conclude that the 
DOW effect in Australia is independent from the U.S. seasonal. Easton and Faff [1994] 
extend Jaffe and Westerfield study by incorporating Connolly [1989]’s methodology to adjust 
for the upward bias in the F-statistics when the sample is large and when the distribution is 
non-normal. Their empirical results also support the strong independence from the U.S. effect. 
 
Although the DOW effect centres upon Monday returns in the U.S. and Tuesday returns 
in Australia, these studies examine the overall linkage on each day of the week between the 
two markets rather than the specific causality relationship between the anomalies. Their 
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findings therefore may not necessarily provide direct evidence as to whether the Tuesday 
effect is the result of the weekend effect in the U.S. when other positive weekday returns in 
the U.S. may not have significant impact on the other weekday returns in Australia. Hence, 
further examination on the issue is warranted. 
 
With the advances in computer technology and increased integration of the world 
markets, it is important to consider the effects of other major markets while re-examining the 
U.S.-Australia linkages. We extend earlier studies and investigate whether U.K. Monday 
returns and Tuesday returns in Japan may also have any effect on Tuesday returns in Australia 
since these two major markets also exhibit DOW regularities and have strong economic ties 
with Australia in trades. 
 
In this paper, we document that the Tuesday effect in Australia is Granger caused by the 
weekend effect in U.S. and not the other way conditional on the returns in the U.K. and 
Japanese markets. We also find that in recent years where the U.S. Monday effect has 
reversed, the Tuesday effect in Australia also turns into significantly positive. This latter 
finding provides further evidence in the causality relationship between these two countries. 
Finally, we also found a two-way Granger causation between returns in the Australian and 
U.K. markets, but no causation was found between the Australian and Japanese markets. 
 
The plan of the study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and 
methodology for various tests conducted. Section 3 reports the empirical results. Some 
concluding remarks are given in Section 4. 
 
2. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
The data for this study are daily total market return indices of Australia, Japan, U.K. and 
U.S. obtained from DATASTREAM. These indices have been adjusted for dividends and 
provide the longest sampling period we can find from the same database dating back from 
January 1973 through December 2000. The daily returns are calculated from the first 
difference of the log of indices multiplied by 100.  
 
In this paper, simple t-tests are first conducted to examine the significance of the DOW 
effects in Australia U.S., U.K. and Japan. As financial time series data are typically non-
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stationary, it is important to test whether each return series contains a unit root using the 
augmented Dickey-Fuller test. Finally, Granger causality tests are conducted to test the 
significance and direction of causality between the market returns.  
 
According to Granger [1969], a variable X is said to ‘Granger-cause’ Y if the past values 
of X help in the prediction of Y after controlling for past values of Y, or equivalently if the 
coefficients on the lagged values of X are statistically significant. We extend the definition of 
Granger causality to test if U.S. returns Granger cause the Tuesday effect in Australia 
conditional on the returns in the U.K. and Japanese markets. The equations for two-way 
causality tests are given by 
 
∑ ∑∑∑ −
= −
−−
−
=
−
=
− +++++=
1
0 1
1
01
n
i
t
n
i
itiiti
n
i
iti
n
i
ititt uZeWdYcXbaX  (1) 
 
*
1
1
2
1
**
1
*
1
2
**
t
n
i
n
i
tiiti
n
i
iti
n
i
ititt uZeWdYcXbaY +++++= ∑ ∑∑∑
=
+
−
−−
=
−
+
=
−  (2) 
 
where Xt and Zt are Tuesday returns in Australia and Japan, Yt and Wt are Monday returns in 
U.S. and U.K., repectively, Xt-i, Yt-i, Wt-i and Zt-i are their respective lagged returns, and ut is a 
random disturbance with zero mean and finite variance. Equations (1) and (2) will be 
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) method. A test of the null that U.S. Monday 
returns do not Granger cause the Tuesday effect in Australia is obtained using an F-test for 
joint significance of lagged Y in equation (1) that also depends on lagged X, lagged W and 
lagged Z. 
 
Evidence suggests that stock returns have time-varying volatility and error terms from 
OLS regressions involving stock returns are also not normally distributed. Thus, the 
generalised autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model developed by 
Bollerslev [1986] which incorporates heteroscedasticity and distinguishes between non-
normal conditional and unconditional errors is also used to examine the DOW effect. For the 
GARCH(1,1) model, the conditional variance of the unconditional shock ut in equation (1) is 
given by 
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where ηt is a sequence of normally, independently and identically distributed random 
variables with zero mean and unit variance, ω > 0, α > 0, and β ≥ 0. 
 
3. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
3.1 Another Look at the Weekend Effect 
 
The summary statistics of day of the week returns for Australia, U.S., U.K., and Japan 
from January 1973 to December 2000 are presented in Table 1. Consistent with the previous 
studies, we find that the U.S. and the U.K. markets exhibit negative average returns only on 
Mondays and with high positive average returns on Fridays. We also find that Japan and 
Australia have the highest negative average returns on Tuesdays and highest positive returns 
on Wednesday and Thursdays, respectively. The skewness and kurtosis of the daily returns of 
each market also show significant non-normality at the 1% level as reported by the Jarque-
Bera test. Since many large negative returns centered around Mondays in the U.S. and U.K. 
markets and around Tuesdays in Australia and Japan, not surprisingly, these returns are the 
most negatively skewed. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the t-statistics of the day of the week returns of the four 
major markets for the full period from January 1973 to December 2000. Contrary to the 
earlier findings, the weekend anomalies in the U.S. have all but disappeared. Similarly, 
Australia and Japan’s average negative returns on Tuesdays are not statistically significant. 
The only exception is the U.K. market where it still exhibits the Monday effect. One reason 
that our statistical results may differ from others is that earlier studies derive their results from 
the sampling period in the 80s and earlier whereas ours come from the sampling period that 
extends to the end of 2000. We therefore look into the difference in the DOW returns further 
by examining the behaviour in the sub-periods.  
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[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
 
Panel B documents the t-statistics of the first sub-period from January 1973 to 
December 1987.2 All four markets clearly show the anomalies on either Monday or Tuesday 
at either 1 or 5 percent level. It is thus consistent with the results of the earlier studies which 
are driven by the first sub-period where the negative Monday and Tuesday returns are the 
most dominant. The contrast of the t-statistics with those in the second sub-period also 
supports this finding. 
 
The last panel in Table 2 shows that from January 1988 to December 2000, the Monday 
and Tuesday effects in the U.S. and Australian markets have reversed themselves from 
significantly negative to positive, and have disappeared in the U.K. and Japanese markets. 
From the t-statistics, we find that the reversal or the disappearance of the effects in the sub-
period has offset those in the earlier sub-period and attenuates the overall effects of Monday 
and Tuesdays in the full period. This trend is consistent across all of the four markets and 
provides indirect evidence that the Tuesday effect in Australia maybe related to the anomalies 
of the other markets but one day out of phase due to the different time zone. Therefore, we 
further investigate the linkage directly by examining whether the U.S. weekend effect 
granger-caused Australia’s Tuesday effect conditional on the weekend effects in U.K. and 
Japan. 
 
3.2 Do the U.S., U.K. and Japan Anomalies Granger-cause Australia’s Tuesday Effect? 
 
Before conducting Granger causality tests, augmented Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test is used 
to determine if each of the return series is stationary. For weekly data, an initial lag length of 
twelve is used for the unit root test. The t-statistics for the ADF tests reject the null hypothesis 
of a unit root in each day of week return series for Australia, U.S., U.K. and Japan at the 1% 
level. We therefore conclude that each series is stationary. 
 
We run the Granger causality tests according to equation (1) and (2). In the week of 
international markets crash in October 1997, extreme negative returns of 4.5% and 8.4% were 
recorded for Australia’s Tuesday and U.S. Monday, respectively. To control for extreme 
observations which can adversely affect the estimates of equations (1) and (2), a dummy 
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variable is included. The dummy variable is set to unity for the week of market crash and to 
zero for all other weeks. Results of the estimation using EViews 4 program are reported in 
Table 3. The F-statistics show that the U.S. past returns captures variation in Australia’s 
Tuesday effect at the 1% level, while Australia lagged returns are not statistically significant 
in explaining the U.S weekend effect.3 We therefore find at the U.S. past returns Granger 
caused the Australia’s Tuesday effect. 
 
[Insert Table 3 about here.]  
 
In fact, not reported in Table 3, we find that among the lagged returns, the U.S. Monday 
returns are the most significant factor in explaining the Tuesday returns in Australia based on 
the t-statistics. Although we have the similar finding that the U.K.’s lagged returns also have 
significant effect on Australia’s Tuesday returns, the same can be said on the returns of 
Australia on the U.K’s. Lastly, we are surprised that Japan’s and Australia’s returns have no 
significant effect on each other’s anomalies.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
 
In this study, we find that the Australia’s Tuesday effect that has been documented in 
earlier studies has disappeared due to the reversal of the effect in the recent period. We also 
find similar pattern exists in the anomalies of the U.S. and returns in Japan with the exception 
of U.K. in the overall period. We examine whether the anomalies of these major markets have 
influenced the behaviour of the Tuesday returns in Australia and provide evidence of one-way 
Granger causality from U.S. returns to Australia’s Tuesday effect and not the other way 
conditional on the lagged returns of the U.K. and Japanese markets. Although this paper does 
not explain the weekend effect in the U.S., the disappearance of the anomalies in the major 
markets casts doubt on any explanations of microstructure theories on the weekend effect. 
Furthermore, the evidence we find here suggests that the weekend anomalies in other markets 
may be first induced by the U.S. Monday effect. 
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Notes 
 
1. Japan is also found to have Tuesday effect. 
 
2. When the week of October 1987 crash is excluded from the sample, we still find 
significant negative returns on Mondays and Tuesdays in the four major markets. 
 
3. We incorporate GARCH (1,1) in the tests, and find the results similar to those reported 
here. 
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Table 1: Summary of Day of the Week Returns for Australia, U.S., U.K. and Japan 
 
 
 
Mean Std Dev Skewness Kurtosis 
Jarque-
Bera 
      
  Panel A: Australia   
      
Monday -0.0125 1.1661 -0.733 13.85 7297.166* 
Tuesday -0.0522 1.2741 -8.303 197.31 2315187* 
Wednesday 0.0907 1.0541 0.305 8.55 1899.1* 
Thursday 0.1255 1.005 -0.167 8.83 7297.2* 
Friday 0.0909 0.9998 -0.679 11.53 4541.6* 
      
  Panel B: U.S.   
      
Monday -0.0101 1.1155 -5.043 87.42 440067.6* 
Tuesday 0.065 0.9453 0.453 5.64 472.99* 
Wednesday 0.0816 0.8839 0.612 9.72 2842.8* 
Thursday 0.0358 0.9037 0.118 6.22 636.97* 
Friday 0.0631 0.9286 -0.692 9.3 2536.6* 
      
  Panel C: U.K.   
      
Monday -0.0807 1.0753 -0.548 11.71 4687.8* 
Tuesday 0.1068 1.0437 -1.276 21.62 21491* 
Wednesday 0.0922 0.9725 0.009 6.46 731.3* 
Thursday 0.0452 0.9946 0.49 9.68 2777.4* 
Friday 0.1222 0.9935 0.516 10.82 3784.3* 
      
  Panel D: Japan   
      
Monday -0.0124 1.1338 -0.554 8.81 2128.4* 
Tuesday -0.0349 0.979 -2.182 55.47 168754* 
Wednesday 0.0921 0.9444 0.574 12.3 5341.5* 
Thursday 0.0242 0.9204 -0.017 7.38 21168.3* 
Friday 0.0496 0.9225 0.686 10.86 3876.2* 
      
Std Dev is the standard deviation of the returns. 
Jarque-Bera is the normality test.  
* denotes significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 2:  t-Statistics for the Average Returns on Each Day of the Week for Australia,  
U.S., U.K., and Japan 
 
 Australia U.S. U.K. Japan 
     
 Panel A: January 1973 to December 2000  
     
Monday -0.4111 -0.3469 -2.8673 -0.417 
Tuesday -1.5662 2.6277 3.9097 -1.3618 
Wednesday 3.2892 3.5291 3.5459 3.7259 
Thursday 4.7719 1.5136 1.7372 1.0068 
Friday 3.4766 2.6003 4.7029 2.0565 
     
 Panel B: January 1973 to December 1987  
     
Monday -1.0309 -2.1906 -3.1964 1.9307 
Tuesday -3.0008 1.5033 2.7475 -3.0965 
Wednesday 2.0674 2.9783 2.7241 5.6663 
Thursday 5.026 1.857 1.0894 1.5003 
Friday 3.7345 1.9723 4.158 3.4887 
     
 Panel C: January 1988 to December 2000  
     
Monday 0.6852 2.5508 -0.3252 -1.9018 
Tuesday 2.3545 2.239 2.9718 0.9479 
Wednesday 2.8252 1.9263 2.3274 0.7047 
Thursday 1.0462 0.2594 1.4855 0.2067 
Friday 0.6974 1.7228 2.2928 0.0463 
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Table 3:  F-Statistics on the Granger Causality Test of Equations (1) and (2)  
from January 1973 to December 2000 
 
 
  Australia 
   
 U.S. 37.308* 
  1.262 
   
 U.K. 11.82* 
  4.449* 
   
 Japan 0.995 
  1.337 
   
The first row shows the F-statistics of U.S., U.K. or Japan Granger-caused Australia 
and the second row is of Australia Granger-caused U.S., U.K., or Japan. 
* denotes significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
